First, in an article entitled Remembering the Important Lessons of the Cold War I tried to explain that the reason the Cold War did not turn into a hot, shooting, war is that both sides understood that they simply could never win and that any escalation in strikes and counter-strikes could very rapidly lead to a intercontinental nuclear war, something which neither side was willing to risk. A few days later I posted an article entitled Why the US-Russian Nuclear Balance is as Solid as Ever in which I tried to dispel the myth prevalent in the West about the putative state of disrepair of the Russian military in general, and of the Russian nuclear forces in particular.
Dimitri Danilov bio It would be naive to presume that the internationalization of the Yugoslav conflict is related primarily to attempts by European states and international organizations to find a just solution to the Kosovo issue.
As has happened so often before, events in the Balkans are being used by leading European players as a mechanism for attaining their own political goals, which are entirely unrelated to the fate of Yugoslav peoples, be they Albanians, Serbs, or Montenegrins. These goals significantly transcend the parameters of regional interests.
The evidence for this is twofold: Having gone through a difficult period of ideological and military-political confrontation followed by easing of international tensions and a [End Page 51] final ending of the Cold War between East and West, Europe, which was enjoying a new era of pan-European cooperation and partnership, once again is faced with destabilizing challenges.
These challenges are not, as yet, irreversible, and, despite the gravity of the current political crisis, participants in the European security system are demonstrating a political will to resolve it in a spirit of cooperation and partnership.
In order to preserve this strategic orientation, they need to prevent further serious erosion of the collective system, erosion that has resulted from uncoordinated policy efforts toward resolving the Yugoslav crisis.
Otherwise, Europe might have to face a chain reaction of new political extremism and adventurism, which would be highly dangerous regardless of where it emerges. Erosion of the European Collective Security System After the end of the Cold War, Europe, having managed to overcome the very real danger of global military conflict, faced new threats and security challenges.
One of the main such challenges was an increase in ethnopolitical conflicts and crises. However, the new political climate—which entailed closer links between East and West based on principles of mutual cooperation and partnership in creation of a peaceful Europe—opened up new possibilities for dealing with local European conflicts.
Overcoming bipolar confrontation led to a substantial increase in the effectiveness of international organizations, including the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCEin cases of anticrisis response.
This was made possible by a wide political consensus of the participating countries. During the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a principal peacekeeping model was established based on a division of labor between international and regional organizations: This act of cooperation was viewed as a prototype for future joint responses to crisis.
With respect to Kosovo inNATO basically refused to follow the established basic model of peacemaking in Europe, having launched its own military operation in Yugoslavia. Such a scenario fundamentally changed the situation, and the NATO operation became a significant factor in the erosion of the European security system.
This is exactly the interpretation that was given by Moscow. Some other resolutions adopted by the UN have been circumvented and violated, such as the UN General Assembly resolution of 9 Decemberwhich supports Security Council control over activity aimed at supporting international peace and security, and the General Assembly resolution of 17 December requiring all states to refrain from any actions relating to armed intervention and occupation, violent change, the undermining of political order, and the destabilization and removal of governments.
Regardless of particular legal aspects, NATO military operations in Yugoslavia signify that the existing international legal system no longer provides guarantees for sovereign states against outside intervention that has not been sanctioned by the international community in accordance with the UN Charter and its procedures.
The world now must be aware of the possibility of such aggression.
Either NATO and non-NATO countries alike, while overcoming the Yugoslav crises, will undertake joint efforts to bridge gaps in European security structures and stabilize the situation through clearer regulations on anticrisis activity, especially military action, or future developments in European security will be based on a new role and policy of NATO, well aware of its political and military expansion.
The latter would undoubtedly lead to a reevaluation of national doctrines concerning security and defense policy and of the principles and content of international relations in Europe and around the globe. If the first alternative represents a reestablishment of the system of cooperation and partnership, the second option would lead to its further erosion and in turn create the danger of security-policy renationalization especially in situations where the role and effectiveness of the UN are diminishednew lines of division in Europe, and the enhancement of opposing views, all of which would represent fertile soil for new confrontations.
The new strategic concept of the alliance discussed at the April NATO summit in Washington further tips the scale of European security in favor of destabilization. Second, the principles enunciated in Washington officially raised the possibility that NATO would conduct other actions outside of its zone of responsibility, including military action beyond the Article 5 provisions of its treaty.
NATO may undertake such action in crises that jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of alliance members.THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO UNDERLINGS CLEARLY WERE EMBOLDENED BY their "success" in bombing Yugoslavia, by their earlier bombing of the Serb areas of Bosnia, and by their victories in the other remnants of Yugoslavia -- Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia.
Burgeoning military alliances, with the U. The Kosovo War was an armed conflict in Kosovo that started in late February and lasted until 11 June It was fought by the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (by this time, consisting of the Republics of Montenegro and Serbia), which controlled Kosovo before the war, and the Kosovo Albanian rebel group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with air support from the.
an analysis of the reasons of nato alliances bombing of yugoslavia Outdoor Chase mollycoddled its forcing endue vyingly? Trenton, who has not taken care of anyone and dared to an analysis of communism object to his revelers. In view of NATO’s new strategic concept adopted at the Washington summit, of the bombing of Yugoslavia, and of the transformation of NATO into an enemy, a logical conclusion would be to rename NATO the “North Atlantic Threaty Organization.”.
The purpose of the massive seventy eight day bombing campaign was to force the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the repression of Kosovo's predominantly ethnic Albanian population and to accept NATO's terms for the resolution of Kosovo's future political status.
The US government—under Barack Obama and Donald Trump—has managed to exonerate itself from responsibility for the carnage in Syria and the prolongation of the war there.